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NOT SO RESPECTFUL CONSIDERATION:
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
DEFERENCE OR LACK THEREOF TO
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
OF LAW
By: Cindy G. Buys1
The amount of deference due foreign governments’ statements regarding the meaning of foreign law
has long plagued U.S. courts. Courts have applied a variety of approaches in answering this
question, including reliance on doctrines of international comity, respectful consideration, and Rule
44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court recently attempted to
provide additional guidance to lower courts and litigants in Animal Science Products, Inc. v.
Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., where it created a new, five-factor test. However,
application of this new test is likely to generate continued uncertainty and inconsistency in this
area of law and could potentially lead to negative foreign policy consequences. This article seeks to
delineate the different scenarios in which this issue tends to arise and to suggest a more consistent
approach to deciding these types of issues in the future that will be less likely to interfere with U.S.
foreign relations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Questions of how much deference to accord foreign
governments’ statements regarding the meaning of foreign law have
plagued U.S. courts for decades. These courts have applied a variety of
approaches in determining whether to follow the guidance of a foreign
court or governmental agency or official, or whether to independently
analyze and interpret the foreign law at issue. U.S. courts have relied
on doctrines of comity, respectful consideration, and Rule 44.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in addressing this conundrum. These
varying approaches have created significant uncertainty and
inconsistency in this area of law and potentially could lead to negative
foreign policy consequences.
The amount of deference due a foreign government’s
interpretation of its own law was the key issue in the recent U.S.
Supreme Court case, Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.2 There, the Supreme Court refused to defer to
a Chinese government statement regarding the meaning of Chinese
law.3 While the Court stated that the Chinese government’s
interpretation was entitled to “respectful consideration,” U.S. courts
are not bound by the foreign government’s interpretation, especially
where the foreign government has offered different interpretations of
the same law in different contexts.4 Instead, the Supreme Court created
Animal Sci. Prods. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018)
(hereinafter Animal Science).
3 Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869.
4 Id.
2
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a multi-factor test to be applied to the facts to determine whether and
how much deference is due the foreign government.5
Traditionally, U.S. courts use the doctrine of international
comity when addressing issues of foreign law. In fact, the question
presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari in Animal Science was
framed in terms of international comity.6 However, the Supreme Court
reframed the issue and did not discuss the doctrine of international
comity or its rationale. Instead, the Court framed the issue as one of
providing “respectful consideration” to the representations of a
foreign government.7 In doing so, the Court did not define what it
means by “respectful consideration” or whether and how it may be
different from the doctrine of international comity. It has not fully
grappled with the different contexts in which these issues may arise,
which may help provide guidance for a potential resolution. Its new,
fact-specific, multi-factor test is likely to lead to continued
inconsistency, and thus uncertainty, in this area of law. It is also likely
to harm U.S. foreign relations by not according sufficient weight to a
sovereign foreign government’s interpretation of its own law, thereby
potentially causing offense. If the tables were turned, it is likely that the
U.S. courts and government would be offended if a foreign court were
to reject an official U.S. legal position and impose its own
understanding of the meaning of U.S. law. In addition, the Supreme
Court’s new test may encourage foreign courts to ignore U.S.
government pronouncements of its own law. This article seeks to
delineate the different scenarios in which the issue of the amount of
deference due foreign government interpretations of foreign law tends
to arise and to use this review of past cases to suggest a more consistent

Id.
The Supreme Court accepted the following question presented on certiorari:
(“Whether a court may exercise independent review of an appearing foreign
sovereign’s interpretation of its domestic law (as held by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), or whether a court is ‘bound to defer’ to a foreign
government’s legal statement, as a matter of international comity, whenever the
foreign government appears before the court (as held by the opinion below in accord
with the Ninth Circuit).”) Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Animal Sci. Prods. v.
Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220).
7 Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869.
5
6
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approach to deciding these types of issues in the future that will be less
likely to interfere with U.S. foreign relations.
II. ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. V. HEBEI WELCOME
PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.
Animal Science is just one in a long line of cases in which U.S.
courts have struggled with the issue of how much deference is due to
foreign governments’ interpretations of foreign law.8 However,
because it is the most recent Supreme Court case addressing the issue
of the appropriate deference to foreign governments’ statements of
foreign law, and because the Supreme Court gave its most detailed
discussion of the issue in Animal Science, it makes sense to start with an
understanding of that case.
Animal Science involved a complaint of price-fixing by Chinese
manufacturers and exporters of vitamin C allegedly in violation of U.S.
antitrust laws.9 In their defense, the Chinese defendants claimed that
Chinese law required them to fix the prices and quantity of vitamin C
exports.10 The Chinese Ministry of Commerce submitted an amicus
brief in support of the Chinese sellers in which it stated that the
offending behavior resulted from “a regulatory pricing regime
mandated by the government of China.”11 The U.S. plaintiffs disputed
this claim, and provided some contrary evidence, including a statement
by the Chinese government to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in which the Chinese government represented to the WTO that it
“gave up export administration of . . . vitamin C” in 2002.12
After hearing the evidence, a jury returned a verdict in favor of
the U.S. plaintiffs, finding that the Chinese sellers were not “actually
compelled” to engage in price fixing by Chinese law.13 Accordingly, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered a
judgment against the Chinese sellers in the amount of $147 million in
8
9
10
11
12
13

See infra Part III.C.3.
Id. at 1870.
Id.
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1870.
Id. at 1871.
Id.
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treble damages and enjoined the Chinese sellers from further violations
of U.S. antitrust law.14 The Chinese defendants appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the District
Court.15 While acknowledging competing authority on the issue, the
Second Circuit held that a U.S. court is bound to defer to a foreign
government’s statements regarding the construction and effect of its
own laws and regulations, as long as such statements are reasonable.16
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that it was
bound to defer to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s statements. 17
Determinations of foreign law are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 44.1, which treats them as questions of law.18 Under
Rule 44.1, courts may consider any relevant material or source.19
However, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, Rule 44.1 does not
address the weight a federal court determining foreign law should give
to the views presented by a foreign government.20 Nor does any other
rule or statute. In the spirit of “international comity,” a federal court
should carefully consider a foreign state’s views about the meaning of
its own laws.21
In light of the lack of statutory guidance, the Supreme Court
stated that in determining foreign law under FRCP 44.1, a U.S. “court
should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government’s
submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign
government’s statements.”22 The amount of deference due the foreign
government’s statement(s) will depend on the circumstances.23 The
Supreme Court then proffered a laundry list of factors to consider
when evaluating a foreign government’s view of its own law, including:
“the statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1872.
Id.
Id. at 1874.
Id. at 1873.
Id.
Id. at 1868.
Id.
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869 (emphasis added).
Id.

53

2021

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

10:1

purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and
authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the
statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past
positions.”24 The Supreme Court noted that when a foreign
government makes conflicting statements or offers its interpretation
of its law in the context of litigation, U.S. courts may need to exercise
more caution in evaluating the foreign government’s submission.25
In applying this guidance in Animal Science, the Supreme Court
decided that the Chinese Ministry’s statements were not entitled to
deference because they were offered for the purposes of litigation and
the government had offered a prior inconsistent interpretation in
another context.26 The Supreme Court distinguished prior cases in
which more deference was given to statements of foreign governments
because in those cases, there was no inconsistency in the foreign
government’s prior statements.27 The Court stated that its decision was
consistent with international practice as reflected in two international
treaties (to which the United States is not a party): the European
Convention on Information on Foreign Law and the Inter-American
Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, both of
which treat information provided by foreign governments as
nonbinding.28 The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration in
accordance with its opinion.29
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Animal Science that U.S. courts
are “not bound to accord conclusive effect to foreign government’s
statements” is not particularly controversial standing alone.30 One can
easily imagine circumstances in which an absolute rule in favor of blind
deference could lead to undesirable results. Just as federal circuit court
splits regularly exist in U.S. law, differing interpretations are followed
by different courts or executive branch officials of foreign
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
Id. at 1873.
Id. at 1874–75.
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1874.
Id. at 1875.
Id.
Id. at 1869.
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governments and have not yet been resolved internally. In such
situations, the proper interpretation of the foreign law would not be
settled and would not be entitled to deference. However, the Supreme
Court’s decision is bound to lead to further confusion where it falls
short in four critical aspects: (1) failure to create a presumption in favor
of an interpretation proffered by an appropriate foreign-government
official regarding its own law; (2) failure to define “respectful
consideration”; (3) failure to explain how “respectful consideration”
may differ from international comity; and (4) omission of ‘weight’ or
‘hierarchy’ from the new multi-factor test. This article reviews how
federal courts have addressed this issue in the past and suggests a
different approach to bring further clarity and certainty to this area of
law.
III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DETERMINING FOREIGN LAW
As evident from the Court’s decision in Animal Science, there
are at least three different rules or tests courts have applied in the past
to assist in determining how much weight to give statements of foreign
law by foreign governments: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1;
(2) international comity; and (3) respectful consideration. This section
describes each of these approaches and provides examples of their past
usage to identify common themes and to determine the best approach
to future cases.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1: Determining Foreign Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 provides in relevant part,
In determining foreign law, the court may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question
of law.31

31

FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
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Rule 44.1, adopted in 1966, represented a change from earlier
common law practice, which treated questions of foreign law as
questions of fact and required such questions to be pleaded and proven
in accordance with the rules of evidence.32 By contrast, under Rule
44.1, courts may conduct their own research and may consider “any
relevant material or source” in determining the meaning of foreign
law.33
The Advisory Committee Notes from 1966 state, “Rule 44.1 is
added by amendment to furnish Federal courts with a uniform and
effective procedure for raising and determining an issue concerning
the law of a foreign country.”34 The Advisory Committee Notes
further state that “the rule provides flexible procedures for presenting
and utilizing material on issues of foreign law by which a sound result
can be achieved with fairness to the parties.”35
In applying Rule 44.1 to the Chinese government’s
interpretation of its law on behalf of the respondents in Animal Science,
the Supreme Court noted that Rule 44.1 does not explain how much
weight to give to the views of a foreign government.36 Thus, Rule 44.1
is a starting point, but not an ending point for this analysis. In
addressing this issue, the Supreme Court in Animal Science held that a
U.S. “court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign
government’s submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect
to the foreign government’s statements.”37 Modeling a spirit of
flexibility similar to Rule 44.1, the Supreme Court created the multifactor test described above to determine the weight to be given to a
foreign government’s statement regarding the meaning of its own
law.38

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1872–73.
FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 addition.
Id.
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1873.
Id. at 1869.
Id. at 1873–74.
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B. International Comity
A second approach U.S. courts have long applied in
determining whether to recognize and give effect to judgments of
foreign courts is international comity.39 As discussed below, there are
varying definitions of comity, but many of these definitions include use
of the words “respect” and “consideration,” suggesting that
international comity may be quite similar to the doctrine of “respectful
consideration.”40 However, a review of the case law indicates that U.S.
courts use the doctrine of international comity most frequently to give
res judicata effect to foreign judgments in U.S. courts, rather than to give
effect to interpretations of foreign law by foreign governments. Thus,
there may be a subtle, but important difference between the two
doctrines.
Consistent with the most common usage of international
comity, Black’s Law Dictionary limits the concept of comity to “respect
[for] the judicial decisions of another state.”41 However, other lawrelated sources define the concept of comity more broadly to include
respect for other pronouncements by foreign governments in addition
to court decisions. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines
comity as “[t]he courteous and friendly understanding, by which each
nation respects the laws and usages of every other, so far as may be
without prejudice to its own rights and interests.”42 Similarly, the Legal
Information Institute at Cornell Law School defines comity as “[t]he
legal principle that political entities (such as states, nations, or courts
from different jurisdictions) will mutually recognize each other’s
legislative, executive, and judicial acts. The underlying notion is that

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 30 (2d ed.
1841); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
40
In fact, one way to view the doctrine of respectful consideration is as a
subset of cases involving international comity.
41 Comity,
THE
LAW
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://thelawdictionary.org/judicial-comity/
(last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
42 Comity
of
nations,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/36943?redirectedFrom=comity#eid
(last
visited Nov. 22, 2021).
39
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different jurisdictions will reciprocate each other’s judgments out of
deference, mutuality, and respect.”43
One of the most cited statements on comity in U.S. law is the
Supreme Court’s description of the doctrine in Hylton v. Guyot from
1895. There the Court stated,
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its law.44
International comity serves both public and private purposes.45
It promotes friendly relations among nations by showing respect for
the acts of co-equal sovereign governments, in part, to have that
respect returned in equal measure.46 It also serves to bring an end to
litigation, thereby conserving judicial resources when used to give res
judicata effect to a foreign judgment.47 Moreover, it facilitates
Comity, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity
(last visited Nov. 22, 2021).
44
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (This statement has been
subject to much academic criticism as being “both incomplete and ambiguous”); see,
e.g., William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2072,
2075 (2015) (noting it is ambiguous because it does not clarify whether and to what
extent U.S. courts are bound by the doctrine); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping
“International Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998) (The statement is incomplete
because it does not fully encompass how the doctrine has been applied by U.S
courts); Comity, supra, note 43.
45
Dodge, supra note 44, at 2095.
46
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 32–35 (2d.
ed. 1841) (“The true foundation on which the administration of international law
must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which arise from mutual
interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a
contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that
justice may be done to us in return.”).
47 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 98 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1971).
43
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international commerce by giving parties to an international business
transaction some assurance that their contracts will be enforceable in
multiple jurisdictions.48
Professor Michael Ramsey argues that there are two different
strands of international comity involving decisions of foreign courts:
(1) whether to give res judicata effect to a foreign judgment, and (2)
whether to use the foreign judgment as proof of foreign law.49
Professor Ramsey does not use the phrase international comity for
either one because he believes it leads to confusion and uncertainty.50
Regardless, a review of the case law shows that courts use the concept
of international comity much more frequently to refer to the
recognition of foreign judgments rather than to refer to giving
evidentiary weight to interpretations of foreign law by foreign
government officials.51
In Animal Science, the Supreme Court gave a nod to the concept
of comity when it stated, “[i]n the spirit of ‘international comity,’ a
federal court should carefully consider a foreign state’s views about the
meaning of its own laws.”52 However, it did not further discuss the
principle of international comity or cases decided pursuant to that
principle. Instead, its holding referred to the concept of “respectful
consideration.”53 In light of the fact that U.S. courts more commonly
use the concept of international comity to decide whether to give res
judicata effect to decisions by foreign courts, it may be that the U.S.
Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of “respectful
48
Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 164-65 (Ernest G. Lorenzen ed., 1947)); see also Dodge, supra
note 44, at 2085.
49
Ramsey, supra note 44, at 906 (The proof of foreign law strand of comity
appears most similar to the “respectful consideration” doctrine).
50 Id. at 893, 931 (Professor Ramsey briefly discusses “enforcement of
foreign law,” but that seems to occur when the entire lawsuit rests on the application
of foreign law as opposed to the application of U.S. law with one element of foreign
law at issue. The article focuses instead on a conflicts of laws analysis regarding
whether U.S. or foreign law should be used to resolve the dispute).
51 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 98 (Am. L. Inst. 1971) and
cases cited therein.
52
Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1873 (internal citation omitted).
53 Id. at 1869.
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consideration” to refer to the “proof of foreign law” issue, i.e., the
weight to be given to an official pronouncement by a foreign
government regarding the meaning of its own law.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Animal Science, a
lower federal court discussed different types of international comity in
JYCC v. Doe Run Resources Corp.54 There, the U.S. district court had to
decide whether a case against a U.S. corporation, involving injuries to
Peruvian children allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to toxic
lead emissions from a smelter operated by a Peruvian subsidiary of the
U.S. corporation, should be heard in the United States or Peru.55 The
U.S. corporation moved to dismiss the U.S. case on the basis of
international comity.56 The district court drew a distinction between
prescriptive, prospective, and retrospective comity.57 The court stated
that prescriptive comity is afforded to lawmakers and legislators and
serves as a guide to statutory interpretation where the issues to be
resolved are entangled in international relations.58 Prescriptive comity
was not at issue in JYCC because neither the legislative authority of
Peru nor the United States was at issue.59
The court described prospective adjudicative comity as a form
of abstention similar to the forum non conveniens doctrine.60 It takes into
account the interests of the foreign government, the U.S. government,
and the international community in seeing the dispute resolved.61 In
JYCC, the parties submitted conflicting letters purporting to reflect the
views of the Peruvian government as to whether the litigation should
proceed in the U.S. court.62 These letters were from a Peruvian
Minister of Economy and Finance and two Peruvian Congressmen and
presented contradictory positions.63 Applying the factors identified by
JYCC v. Doe Run Resources Corp., 403 F.Supp.3d 737 (E.D. Mo 2019).
Id.
56 Id. at 743.
57 Id. at 747–48. For a discussion of these different types of comity, see also
Dodge, supra note 44, at 2075.
58
JYCC, 403 F.Supp.3d at 747.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 748.
63 Id.
54
55
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the Supreme Court in Animal Science, the district court determined that
the letters from the government officials were not persuasive as to
Peru’s interest in the case because they were conflicting, prepared by
the opposing parties for purposes of the litigation, and did not
represent the official position of the Peruvian government.64
Ultimately, the U.S. District Court determined that international
comity did not warrant dismissal of the case.65
International comity has proved an amorphous concept that
has been used by judges and scholars to assist in resolving many
different legal problems including recognition of foreign judgments,
conflicts of laws, acts of state, assistance to foreign courts, forum non
conveniens, abstention, and more.66 Because international comity has
already been stretched in so many directions, it may make sense to
adopt a separate doctrine, such as respectful consideration, to separate
questions of proof of foreign law from recognition of foreign
judgments and other uses of international comity. However, for the
reasons set forth below, the doctrine of respectful consideration itself
requires more development and clarification.
Before leaving the discussion of international comity, it should
be noted that there is a distinction between giving deference to
interpretations of foreign law offered by foreign courts as compared
to interpretations of international law provided by international courts
and tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice. International
courts and tribunals are not part of co-equal sovereign states. Rather,
they are commonly formed by a group of sovereign States coming
together and agreeing to create an international body to adjudicate
international disputes, usually by treaty. International comity is based
on mutual respect between co-equal sovereign government entities.
Because international courts and other tribunals are not part of these
co-equal sovereign governments, the basis for according respect or
Id. at 749.
Id. As discussed in more detail below, cases such as JYCC that involve
competing interpretations of foreign law where the official and final position of the
foreign government is not clearly established are examples of a situation where less
deference is owed to the statements by foreign officials.
66
Professor Dodge sets forth the many different uses of international
comity in a chart in his article, International Comity. See Dodge, supra note 44, at 2079.
64
65
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deference to interpretive decisions of international courts and tribunals
must rest on a different basis. As discussed below, “respectful
consideration” still may be appropriately used for such decisions
because these international courts and tribunals are expressly given
authority by the sovereign states creating them to provide authoritative
treaty interpretations.
C. “Respectful Consideration”
One reason that attorneys and judges have long struggled with
the meaning of “respectful consideration,” and the appropriate weight
to accord foreign views regarding the interpretation of foreign law, is
that U.S. courts have not been careful and consistent in categorizing
the international or foreign entities that made the statement in question
to help determine the amount of deference due. In general, these cases
fall into three broad categories: (1) decisions by international courts
and tribunals; (2) decisions by foreign courts; and (3) statements by
foreign executive or legislative branch officials. Each is discussed in
turn below.
1. Decisions by International Courts and Tribunals
In the international context, the U.S. Supreme Court has most
prominently used the phrase “respectful consideration” in connection
with decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For example,
in a series of cases brought at the ICJ against the United States for its
failure to provide consular notification to foreign defendants as
required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), all
of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed the ICJ’s
interpretations of the treaty are entitled to “respectful consideration”
because the international court had been given jurisdiction by treaty to
interpret the VCCR.67 However, the justices differed as to how to apply
that standard and the appropriate result of that respectful
consideration. Writing for the majority in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the opinion of the ICJ prioritizing the
United States’ treaty-based obligation to provide consular notification
over state procedural default rules is entitled to “respectful
See Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998); see also Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006).
67
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consideration.”68 However, the majority held that U.S. courts are not
bound by decisions of the ICJ and that the Oregon legal system was
not required to suppress evidence against Sanchez-Llamas due to its
failure to provide timely consular notification to him.69 Justice
Ginsburg concurred in the result but wrote a separate opinion in which
she attempted to distinguish the facts of the Sanchez-Llamas case from
a previous ICJ opinion and to reconcile the ICJ’s interpretation of the
VCCR with a U.S. statute to avoid friction and conflict.70
In a more recent VCCR case, Medellin v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court reaffirmed that, “[i]n considering our own treaty
obligations, we also consider the views of the ICJ itself, ‘giving
respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty
rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret [the
treaty].’”71 The Court did not define the meaning of respectful
consideration, however, or attempt to apply the standard because the
Court stated that it was not clear whether the principle should apply to
the question of the binding nature of the ICJ judgment itself as
opposed to its interpretation of a treaty provision.72
Federal courts have also used the doctrine of “respectful
consideration” when reviewing a decision by an international tribunal
such as the World Customs Organization (WCO).73 In a tariff
classification dispute, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353–54.
Id. at 350. Justice Roberts wrote, “Nothing in the structure or purpose of
the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.
The ICJ’s decisions have ‘no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case,’. Any interpretation of law the ICJ renders in the course of
resolving particular disputes is not binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself; there is
accordingly little reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be
controlling on our courts.” (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
70 Id. at 360 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
71
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 n.9 (2008) (citing Breard, 523 U.S. at
375; Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 333–34).
72
The dissenting justices in Medellin argued that because the United States
had consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction by treaty, U.S. courts were bound by the ICJ’s
decision directing Texas to review and reconsider its judgment against Medellin when
Texas failed to provide the required consular notification. See Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 538 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73 See Cummins, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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stated that a WCO classification opinion is not binding but is entitled
to respectful consideration.74 The court analogized the case to SanchezLlamas, stating that when an international court or tribunal interprets
an international treaty, a U.S. court is not bound to defer to the
international opinion or to treat it as obligatory, but in performing its
own independent analysis, the U.S. court may consult the international
opinion for its persuasive authority.75
2. Decisions by Foreign Courts
A second category of cases consists of decisions by foreign
courts interpreting foreign law. This line of cases involve what
Professor Ramsey refers to as the use of a foreign judgment as proof
of the content of foreign law.76 Perhaps surprisingly, there are few
cases in which a U.S. court was asked to use a foreign judgment to
inform its understanding of the foreign law separate from enforcing a
decision by a foreign court as res judicata.77 Most of these cases are
framed instead as a decision whether to recognize a judgment by a
foreign court interpreting its own law.78
In Animal Science, both at oral argument and in its decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court referred to the “analogous” submissions of state
governments.79 The Court stated that if the relevant state law is
Id. at 1366.
Id.
76
Ramsey, supra note 44, at 906. The proof of foreign law strand of comity
appears most similar to the respectful consideration doctrine. It is neither
“prescriptive comity,” which refers to conflicts of law or the application of the act
of state doctrine, nor “adjudicative comity,” which refers to recognition of foreign
judgments and judicial assistance. See Dodge, supra note 44, at 2079.
77
In his article, Escaping “International Comity,” Professor Ramsey provides
several examples of cases involving a res judicata effect, but only one example of proof
of foreign law, i.e., Ramsay v. Boeing, 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970). See Ramsey, supra
note 44, at 893.
78 See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 897 F.3d
1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2018) (U.S. court refuses to “second guess” or invalidate
decisions by the Dutch Court of Appeals and State Secretary settling questions of
ownership of artwork stolen by Nazis in WWII under Dutch royal decrees).
79
At oral argument, Justices Gorsuch, Kennedy, and Breyer all asked
questions that analogized to deference to state court judgments. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
74
75
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established by a decision of a state’s highest court, that decision is
binding on federal courts.80 Some scholars and lower court judges also
have made comparisons between decisions of the U.S. states’ highest
courts and decisions by the highest court of a foreign country.81 This
line of reasoning in Animal Science suggests the Supreme Court may
view a legal interpretation of foreign law by the highest court of a
foreign country as similarly authoritative to a state’s highest court, or
at least entitled to more weight than a statement by an official of the
executive or legislative branch.
3. Statements By Foreign Executive And Legislative Branch
Officials
Statements of foreign law by foreign executive or legislative
officials have given U.S. courts the most difficulty in determining how
much deference is due. The following discussion provides several
demonstrative examples, which serve to both illustrate the problems
and to highlight some commonalities that may lead to a better
approach in the future.
a.

Extradition Cases

The issue of deference to a foreign government’s
interpretation of its own law has frequently arisen in the context of
extradition. In such cases, the defendant opposing extradition from the
United States to another country frequently claims a defect with the
criminal process in the foreign country. The U.S. court must determine
whether the extradition may properly go forward, which in turn may

1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220), 28 WL 1932827, at *7-9, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/161220_4hd5.pdf.
80 Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1874 (internal citations omitted). However, the
Supreme Court also stated that if the interpretation of law is made by an attorney
general, it is not entitled to controlling weight. Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1874 (citing
Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-77, n. 30 (1997); Virginia
v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393-96 (1988)).
81 See, e.g., Kristen Eichensehr, International Decision, Animal Science Products,
Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 116 (2019); In re Oil
Spill of the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992).
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require the U.S. court to inquire into the propriety of the procedures
followed in the foreign country requesting the extradition.
Extradition is usually governed by a bilateral extradition treaty
between the United States and a foreign country, implemented in U.S.
law through a federal extradition statute.82 The scope of judicial review
in such cases is quite limited. The “judicial officer’s inquiry is confined
to the following: whether a valid treaty exists; whether the crime
charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence
marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is sufficient
under the applicable standard of proof.”83 The narrow scope of judicial
inquiry in such cases is partly due to principles of international
comity.84 As the Second Circuit stated in Skaftouros v. United States, “it
has long been recognized that an extradition judge should avoid
making determinations regarding foreign law.”85 In Skaftouros, a Greek
national fought his extradition from the United States to Greece to
stand trial as an accomplice to kidnapping and murder of a minor on
several procedural grounds.86 The Greek government, with the
assistance of its prosecutor’s office, defended its procedures as proper
under the Greek criminal code.87
The Skaftouros court stated that in extradition cases, U.S. courts
are strongly discouraged from reviewing whether the foreign country
has complied with its own laws.88 Arguments as to compliance with
foreign law are for the courts of the foreign country, not for U.S. courts
to resolve.89 U.S. courts have repeatedly stated they should not engage
in an examination of the foreign country’s laws and procedures in
extradition cases except to ensure the requirements of the treaty and
implementing statute are met.90 For these reasons, the Second Circuit
18 U.S.C § 3184 (2021).
Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
84 See Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
85 Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 156 (citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 48485 (2d Cir. 1976)).
86 See Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 146-47.
87 See id. at 152-53.
88 Id. at 156.
89 Id.
90 Id.
82
83
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in Skaftouros determined that the district court had erred in placing the
burden of proof on the Greek government to demonstrate compliance
with Greek law.91
Other courts in the United States also have been highly
deferential to foreign governments’ interpretation of their own law in
extradition cases. For example, in Cornea v. Sessions, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted a Greek court’s interpretation of the
Greek Criminal Code with respect to service of process requirements
when interpreting the U.S.-Greek extradition treaty.92 Similarly, in Basic
v. Steck, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted a Bosnian
government’s interpretation of which documents constitute an arrest
warrant under Bosnian criminal law.93 Most recently, in Taylor v.
McDermott, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts accepted a Japanese prosecutor’s evidence of the
meaning of Japanese criminal law, stating that although Animal Science
was not an extradition case, a U.S. court should still give “‘respectful
consideration’ and ‘substantial but not conclusive weight’ to a foreign
government’s interpretation of its own law.”94
While U.S. courts have been very deferential to foreign
government interpretations of their own criminal laws and procedures
in extradition cases, some of that deference may be explained by the
context. In such cases, the defendant will have another opportunity to
raise any procedural defects in the criminal courts of the prosecuting
country, which will be applying its own law.95 However, in other
contexts, there may not be a second opportunity for a foreign court to
review and interpret its own laws. Perhaps partly for this reason, U.S.
courts have not shown the same level of deference on issues of foreign
law outside the extradition context.
Id. at 157.
See Cornea v. Sessions, No. 18-61069, 2018 U.S. Dist LEXIS 120008 (S.D.
Fla. July 17, 2018); see also Liuksila v. Tunner, 351 F. Supp.3d 166, 179-80 (D.D.C.
2018) (U.S. court deferred to Finnish government’s representations regarding certain
procedural matters under Finnish law in an extradition proceeding).
93 See Basic v. Steck, 819 F.3d 897, 901 (6th Cir. 2016).
94
Taylor v. McDermott, No. 4:20-cv-11272-IT, 2020 WL 4569693, n.4
(D.Mass. Aug. 7, 2020).
95 See, e.g., Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 147.
91
92
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Non-Extradition Cases

The issue of the amount of deference owed by U.S. courts to
foreign officials’ and governments’ interpretations of foreign law has
arisen in a variety of other cases outside the context of extradition,
such as antitrust matters as in Animal Science, trade policy, and disputes
over international discovery rules.96 Unfortunately, the language and
standards used by U.S. courts in these cases have not been consistent,
leading to confusion and uncertainty.
In the 1942 case of United States v. Pink, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined what effect to give to a 1918 Russian decree nationalizing
Russian property held in New York.97 In that case, the U.S.
government supported recognition of the nationalization decree as
part of the implementation of Litvinov Assignment settling multiple
claims between the United States and the Soviet Union and giving
formal diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union for the first time. 98
At the request of the U.S. government, the Russian government
provided a declaration from its Commissariat for Justice asserting that
the 1918 decree converted the property of formerly private Russian
enterprises and companies to property of the State, regardless of the
location of the property.99 The U.S. Supreme Court accepted that the
Commissariat for Justice had the power to interpret Russian law and
treated this official declaration as “conclusive” as to the extraterritorial
legal effect of the 1918 decree nationalizing the property.100
In the more recent case of Abbott v. Abbott, involving an
international child custody dispute, the U.S. Supreme Court found an
affidavit submitted by the Chilean government agency explaining
custody rights under Chile’s Minors Law 16,618 “notable.”101 It
determined the father’s ne exeat custody rights as described by the
96 See Daniel Fahrenthold, Navigating Respectful Consideration: Foreign Sovereign
Amici in U.S. Courts, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1597, 1622-26 (2019).
97 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210-13 (1942).
98 Id. at 218.
99 Id. at 219-220.
100 Id. at 220. In Animal Science, the Supreme Court largely distinguished Pink
on the ground that there were not conflicting government statements in the Pink
case. Animal Science, 138 S.Ct. at 1874.
101
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2010).
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Chilean government to be consistent with the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague
Convention), and thus enforced the right of custody as described by
the Chilean government.102 While the Supreme Court did not discuss
international comity, respectful consideration, or FRCP 44.1 in Abbott,
it did note that the U.S. government supported the position of the
Chilean government in the litigation and that the Chilean government’s
interpretation of custody rights under the Hague Convention was
consistent with other contracting states to the Convention.103 This case
suggests two additional reasons for greater deference to foreign
governments’ interpretation and application of international treaty law:
(1) proper respect for the role of the political branches in U.S. foreign
policy; and (2) consistency in treaty interpretation.
Both pre and post Animal Science, federal courts of appeals have
struggled with the standard to be used and how much deference to
accord to foreign governments’ interpretations of foreign law. When
faced with competing constructions of French law proffered by the
parties in In re Oil Spill of the Amoco Cadiz, the Seventh Circuit stated
that the French government’s construction of its own law was entitled
to “substantial deference”.104 In reaching this conclusion, the court
pointed out that U.S. courts routinely accept plausible interpretations
of U.S. statutes by the agencies charged with administering them under
the Chevron doctrine.105 According to the court, “[g]iving the
conclusions of a sovereign nation less respect than those of an
administrative agency is unacceptable.”106
On the other hand, while recognizing that U.S. courts may
defer to foreign government interpretations of foreign law, the Fifth
Circuit declined to do so in in Access Telecom Inc. v. MCI Telcomms.
Id. at 11-15.
Id. at 15-16.
104
In re Oil Spill of the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1312 (7th Cir. 1992).
105 Id.
106 Id. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that its
deference to a Customs’ classification ruling is in proportion to its power to persuade.
See Cummins, 454 F.3d at 1363. Later in the same opinion, the court stated that a tariff
classification opinion of the World Customs Organization also has persuasive
authority, thereby suggesting some similarity to the weight of decisions by these two
bodies. Id. at 1366.
102
103
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Corp.107 Access Telecom Inc. involved breach of contract and antitrust
claims by an American company, ATI, against a Mexican
telecommunications company. A key issue was the legality of ATI’s
business under Mexican law.108 The Mexican defendants relied on an
Official Circular issued by the Mexican Secretary of Communications
and Transportation to demonstrate that ATI was operating illegally
under the terms of the Circular, arguing that the Circular was entitled
to deference “as an agency’s interpretation of the laws which it
administers and enforces.”109 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
replied,
The fact that U.S. courts routinely give deference to
U.S. agencies empowered to interpret U.S. law and U.S.
courts may give deference to foreign governments
before the court does not entail that U.S. courts must
give deference to all agency determinations made by all
foreign agencies not before the court.110
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Mexican defendants’
interpretation of the Circular for several reasons, including the fact that
the law had changed since the relevant time and a new circular had
been issued.111 In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
distinguished the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Amoco Cadiz on the
ground that the Mexican government was not a litigant in the Access
Telecom case, whereas the French government had appeared in Amoco
Cadiz and its position on French law was entitled to more weight than
that of a private litigant.112
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to defer to
statements by Honduran government officials in United States v. McNab
when the Honduran government changed its position during the
107 See Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 714
(5th Cir. 1999).
108 See id. at 713.
109 Id. at 714. As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court also drew an analogy
between U.S. agency interpretations of law and interpretations of law by foreign
governments in Animal Science. Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1874.
110 Access Telecom, 197 F.3d at 714.
111 See id. at 715.
112 See id. at 714.
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course of the litigation.113 McNab concerned alleged violations of the
Lacey Act, which prohibits the sale or importation of fish or wildlife
taken in violation of foreign law.114 At trial, several Honduran
government officials provided confirmation of Honduran prohibitions
on the importation, purchase, and sale of certain Caribbean spiny
lobster from Honduras.115 On appeal, the Honduran government
altered its position, putting forward evidence that Honduran law had
changed such that the activities at issue were no longer illegal under
Honduran law.116 The Eleventh Circuit refused to defer to statements
by the Honduran government on appeal stating that the District Court
was entitled to rely on the statements made by the Honduran
government officials at the time of trial despite the government’s later
change in position.117
A U.S. district court also refused to defer to certain foreign
officials’ statements regarding Venezuelan law in Petroleos de
Venezuela.118 In that case, a New York district court had to determine
the effect of certain resolutions of the Venezuelan National Assembly
allegedly condemning a 2016 Exchange Offer that the parties entered
into relating to repayment of bonds. One of the parties to the
transaction was a corporation wholly owned by the Venezuelan
government itself, PDVSA.119 Plaintiffs, consisting of PDVSA and
related entities, sought to avoid their repayment obligations by arguing
that the transaction was invalid because the underlying transaction and
documents had not been approved by the Venezuelan National
Assembly.120 By way of proof, the plaintiffs submitted statements by a
member of the National Assembly, Mr. Guevara, who opined that the
National Assembly would “not recognize any public contract that is

See United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1236, citing 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A).
115 See McNab, 331 F.3d at 1234-35.
116 See id. at 1242.
117 See id.
118 See Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, 495 F.Supp.3d
257 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
119 See id. at 262.
120 See id. at 270.
113
114
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not considered or authorized by the Legislative Branch in accordance
with [article 150 of] the Constitution.”121
The court stated that while it respects Mr. Guevara’s views,
“floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least
illuminating forms of legislative history.”122 Further, referring to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Animal Science, the District Court stated
that it has “respectfully and carefully considered the views the
[Venezuelan] government has expressed regarding the effect of the
September 2016 Resolution.”123 However, the Court declined to give
conclusive effect to those views for three reasons: (1) the Venezuelan
Republic failed to provide support for its position; (2) a Special
Attorney General of Venezuela had previously provided an Opinion
on the legality of the transaction stating a contrary view; and (3) the
Republic’s current position was offered specifically for the purposes of
litigation.124 Likewise, in other cases decided since Animal Science, U.S.
courts have rejected foreign governments’ legal positions because their
own experts’ testimony did not support the legal position taken in
litigation, not because the courts refused to accord deference to a
clearly supported interpretation of another country’s law.125
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION TO THE AMOUNT OF DEFERENCE U.S.
COURTS SHOULD ACCORD TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
STATEMENTS OF FOREIGN LAW
The preceding discussion reviewed the different methods and
factors U.S. courts use when deciding how much weight to give to
statements by foreign governments as to the meaning of foreign law.
In some cases, U.S. courts have applied concepts of international
comity while in others, courts have applied the concept of “respectful
consideration.” In both situations, courts had to examine several
Id. at 278.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
123 Id. at 279.
124 Id. at 279-80.
125 See, e.g., Petersen Energia Inversora S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic and
YPF S.A., 895 F.3d 194, 208 (2d Cir. 2018) (The expert testimony offered by
Argentina regarding the meaning of its corporate law did not support its argument
in litigation); see also In re Grand July Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623,634 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
121
122
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factors to determine whether to accept the foreign government’s
interpretation of its own law. Neither comity nor respectful
consideration has been well-defined, and the variations in approaches
have led to confusion and inconsistencies and may well threaten U.S.
foreign relations.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Animal Science
illustrates the resulting uncertainty. While it mentions both Rule 44.1
and international comity, the Supreme Court’s holding stated that
courts should provide “respectful consideration” to the views of a
foreign government as to its own law.126 However, the Supreme Court
did not define “respectful consideration” and did not explain whether
use of “respectful consideration” may differ depending on whether it
is reviewing a decision by an international court or tribunal, a foreign
court, or a statement by a foreign government official. Instead, the
Supreme Court set forth a five-factor case-by-case test for when it may
be appropriate to defer (or not) to a foreign government’s
interpretation of its own law.127 While this standard certainly keeps
lawyers in business by giving them more to debate, it does little to
clarify the law or to provide guidance to future courts and litigants.
In addition, failure to give appropriate weight to statements
and decisions by foreign governments and courts on foreign law is
likely to lead to negative foreign policy consequences. Since Animal
Science, most lower courts applying this new test have not deferred to
foreign governments’ interpretations of their own laws, thereby risking
harm to friendly relations between sovereign States that doctrines such
as Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State doctrine were
designed to prevent.128 For example, in Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum of Art at Pasadena, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
a case brought by the heir to artwork stolen by the Nazis in the Second
World War.129 Throughout the litigation that spanned many years, the
various judges discussed the foreign policy implications raised by the
California statute on which plaintiff based her claim. Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the complaint due to the Act of State
126
127
128
129

Animal Science, 138 S.Ct. at 1869.
See id.
See, e.g., Petersen Energia, 895 F.3d at 209.
See Von Saher, 897 F.3d at 1156.
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doctrine.130 In reaching this holding, the court stated that to allow the
case to proceed would require U.S. courts to “re-litigat[e] long resolved
matters entangled with foreign affairs” and “second guess” settled
restitution decisions made by the Dutch government and its courts
pertaining to such artwork.131 The court declined to do so in part to
avoid foreign policy complications. A U.S. court’s refusal to accept an
interpretation of foreign law by a foreign government likewise risks
offending the foreign nation and interfering with U.S. foreign policy.
There are at least two different approaches that U.S. courts
might adopt to bring further clarity to this area of law and reduce the
possibility of foreign relations conflicts. First, U.S. courts could
continue to use the concept of “respectful consideration,” but could
start with a presumption in favor of acceptance of the foreign
government’s view of its own law.132 This presumption could be
rebutted by evidence of the factors past case law suggests are most
important, especially situations where different foreign government
officials have offered different interpretations of foreign law and one
or more of those positions were adopted for purposes of litigation, as
occurred in Animal Science.133
Starting with this presumption recognizes that the foreign
government is most familiar and knowledgeable about its own law. It
also diminishes the possibility of conflict with the foreign nation
through a perceived lack of respect for its sovereignty. Presumptions
130 See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d
712, 721 (9th Cir. 2014), quoted favorably on appeal at Van Saher, 897 F.3d at 1156.
131 Id. at 967.
132
This author has also argued in favor of a presumption of validity for
judgments of the International Court of Justice involving treaty interpretation under
the doctrine of “respectful consideration.” See Cindy Galway Buys, The United States
Supreme Court Misses the Mark: Towards Better Implementation of the United States’
International Obligations, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 39, 69 (2008). Factors that support
deference to judgments of international tribunals such as the ICJ include their
expertise in international law, promotion of uniformity in treaty interpretation,
respect for the political branches of government in foreign affairs, and reciprocity of
international obligations. See id. at 68-69.
133
Alternatively, if the U.S. Supreme Court does not adopt a rebuttable
presumption, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could amend Rule
44.1 to create this presumption.
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based on respect for foreign sovereigns are common in international
law. For example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act is based on the
presumption that foreign sovereigns may not be sued in U.S. courts
unless a statutory exception applies.134 Similarly, there is a presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law abroad.135 Adopting a
presumption in favor of accepting a foreign government’s view of its
own law also makes it more likely that a foreign court will accept a U.S.
government interpretation of U.S. law when such a matter comes
before the foreign court.
Second, when applying the factors that have been used by
courts in the past and those set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Animal Science, the courts could create a hierarchy of those factors to
guide future cases. In Animal Science, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested
the following five factors should be taken into account: “the
statement’s clarity, thoroughness, and support; its context and
purpose; the transparency of the foreign legal system; the role and
authority of the entity or official offering the statement; and the
statement’s consistency with the foreign government’s past
positions.”136 However, in reviewing past cases, two factors stand out
as the most common factors cited when a court refuses to accept a
foreign government’s interpretation of its own law: (1) when
government officials have offered contrary interpretations of the law
either in the current litigation or in the past,137 and (2) when the
position taken by the foreign government is new and offered solely for
the purposes of the pending litigation (i.e., the “context and purpose”
of the statement.)138 Past court decisions have not discussed the
transparency of the foreign legal system,139 nor have they discussed the

Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330; 1605.
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
136 Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869.
137 See, e.g., id.; Petroleos de Venezuela, 495 F.Supp.3d at 279-80; McNab,
331 F.3d at 1242; JYCC, 403 F.Supp.3d at 737.
138 See, e.g., Animal Science, 138 S. Ct. at 1869; see also Petroleos de Venezuela,
495 F.Supp.3d at 279-80.
139
Professor Eichensehr raises some important questions about whether a
lack of transparency should lead to more or less deference to a foreign sovereign. See
Eichensehr, supra note 81, at 120.
134
135
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clarity or thoroughness of the statement. Accordingly, these factors
from Animal Science could be removed or at least afforded lesser weight.
U.S. courts have occasionally considered the degree of
evidentiary support for the foreign government’s statement, such as in
Petroleos de Venezuela where the court found that the government
offered no evidence in support of its statement as to the proper
meaning of Venezuelan law.140 With respect to the role and authority
of the entity or official offering the statement, the courts have noted
whether the person offering the statement is an attorney general or
other prosecutor,141 another executive agency official,142 or a
legislator,143 but have not explained why one might be more or less
persuasive or authoritative than another. Determining whether to give
more deference to a foreign executive branch official as opposed to a
member of the legislative branch (or vice versa) opens the door to
complicated and sensitive issues regarding the respective weight of the
executive and legislative branches of the foreign government and the
role of the particular person in that branch. Thus, this factor may be
difficult, if not impossible, to apply and should carry less weight.
However, as noted above, it makes sense to provide heightened
deference to a foreign court’s interpretation of foreign law, at least in
legal systems where the courts have the final say as to the meaning of
the law.
If these suggestions were followed, a court’s approach to the
proper weight to give a foreign government’s interpretation of its own
law would proceed as follows. The U.S. court would start with the
presumption that the foreign government’s statement is an accurate
statement or interpretation of the foreign law at issue. A party
contesting the validity or authority of the statement may rebut that
presumption by providing evidence of inconsistent statements or
interpretations of the same law by the foreign government in the past
and showing that the current position is different and was adopted for
purposes of litigation. Proof that the statement is an accurate
interpretation of foreign law and whether the statement is an official
140
141
142
143

Petroleos de Venezuela, 495 F.Supp.3d at 279-80.
See, e.g., Taylor, 2020 WL 4569693 at n.4.
See, e.g., Petroleos de Venezuela, 495 F.Supp.3d at 279-80.
See, e.g., JYCC, 403 F.Supp.3d at 748.
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and final position of the government as a whole or only the position
of an individual executive officer or legislator would follow as the next
most persuasive evidence. Other factors would carry little, if any,
weight depending on context.
Applying this test in Animal Science may not have changed the
ultimate conclusion of the Supreme Court in that case because the
Chinese government submitted different interpretations of its law in
the context of two cases, one at the WTO and one in U.S. courts.
However, use of the proposed test would provide more guidance and
certainty as to how to resolve such issues in the future.
Other commentators have also been critical of the Supreme
Court’s use of the “respectful consideration” standard in Animal Science
for many of the same reasons outlined here.144 At least one has
suggested that the Supreme Court adopt a “more robust, multi-step
framework” to better guide lower courts, suggesting a model similar to
a multi-step analysis proposed by Justice Breyer in his dissent in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, one of the VCCR cases.145 A major flaw in this
proposal, however, is that it still requires lower courts to weigh
multiple factors, with little guidance as to the weight or hierarchy to
give to each of the factors. It also does not start with a presumption of
deference, which is necessary to recognize the expertise of the
international or foreign court or government and to avoid foreign
policy tensions.146
Adopting a rebuttable presumption does not require U.S.
courts to blindly accept statements of foreign law by government
officials, but instead allows for flexibility in approaching the issue of
what weight to give to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own
law. However, this approach orders and limits the factors courts
should take into account when making this determination. Doing so
144 See, e.g., Daniel Fahrenthold, Navigating Respectful Consideration: Foreign
Sovereign Amici in U.S. Courts, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1597 (Oct. 2019); Eichensehr, supra
note 81, at 121.
145
Fahrenthold, supra note 141, at 1631-32.
146
As Professor Ramsey states, “Foreign courts, not U.S. courts, are
presumably the best judges of foreign law . . . conflict and unfairness may arise from
a U.S. court’s misinterpretation of foreign law.” Ramsey, supra note 44, at 935.
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will likely bring additional clarity and certainty to this area of law by
providing guidance to courts. It also reduces the potential for
international friction by starting with a presumption that respects other
States’ interpretation of their own law and increases the chance that
U.S. statements of law will be respected abroad.
V. CONCLUSION
It is long past time for the U.S. Supreme Court to provide
better guidance to lower courts and litigants on the issue of the amount
of deference owed foreign governments’ statements as to the meaning
of foreign law. The Supreme Court missed the opportunity to clarify
this area of law in Animal Science, leading to continued uncertainty and
inconsistency. The Court’s failure also creates further potential for
unwarranted judicial interference in U.S. foreign relations and
decreases the likelihood of foreign courts’ acceptance of U.S.
statements of U.S. law. For these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court
should adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of acceptance of the
foreign government’s position as to the meaning of its own law. It also
should limit and order the factors to be considered in rebutting this
presumption.

78

